Geo-Economics and Geo-Securities in the Indian Ocean Region by Timothy Doyle

Geo-Economics and Geo-Securities in the Indian Ocean Region by Timothy Doyle

Author:Timothy Doyle [Doyle, Timothy]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781315466941
Goodreads: 39949486
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-04-19T00:00:00+00:00


2. South African maritime defence capability: early beginnings

Because of its strategic importance to the British Empire, the British wrestled the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch (in 1795 and again in 1806) and immediately established a naval base in Simon’s Town. It was an important base in the heyday of the British Empire and as the Royal Navy went unchallenged at sea, British power was projected into the Indian Ocean from Simon’s Town (either by force or through diplomacy). During the two World Wars Simon’s Town was critical for maintaining the security of the Cape Sea Route – of strategic importance to the Allied war effort.

An indigenous navy (later the SAN) was created in 1922 (Goosen, 1973, p. 19). However, a small ocean-going navy was only established during the Second World War when ships that were requisitioned from trade, whaling and fishing were converted into anti-submarine vessels and minesweepers. Altogether 64 whalers and trawlers were converted for naval use by South African shipyards (n.d.), the Railways and Harbours workshops in Cape Town and Durban, and the Royal Navy dockyard in Simon’s Town during the war. These ‘little ships’ had to defend South Africa’s ports and coastline and some of them even participated with distinction in the Mediterranean theatre of war (SAMAD, Box 10; and Box 59).

South Africa contributed substantially to the war effort as far as ship repairs and war supplies are concerned. Because of the bombing of British ports, more ship repair and maintenance for the British Admiralty was done in South Africa (Pienaar, 1964, pp. 49–50 and 67–68). All traffic from the East and Far East (convoys, troopships, supply ships and naval vessels) had to use the Cape Sea Route as the Mediterranean was not open for general shipping, making South African ports crucial for ship repairs, maintenance and supplies. Although South African ports were not adequately prepared for the task at the outbreak of war, it was possible to react to the challenge due to a number of well-equipped facilities that existed (AA Record, n.d., p. 116.). The South African government gave ship repair and maintenance a very high priority and the capacity to repair and equip ships peaked at a high of 250 per month (AA Record, n.d., pp. 116–117 and 125; and Pienaar, 1964, p. 89). Numerous merchantmen and allied naval vessels damaged in the war at sea were repaired in South African ports and could continue with their duties. South Africa therefore made a strategic contribution towards ensuring the flow of the vital maritime traffic around Africa.

Besides the considerable repair and conversion capacity, no important naval vessels were constructed in South Africa during the war. Vessel construction for naval use was restricted to harbour defence motor launches (HDML) constructed in Durban for the British Admiralty. Eleven of these vessels were taken over by the South African naval establishment (Du Toit, 1992, p. 148).

Britain was South Africa’s most important naval partner or ‘guardian’ and the naval links were so strong that, as Admiral H.H.



Download



Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.